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1. Introduction 
Since the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1973 and the switch to floating exchange rates, the 
volatility of the real exchange rate (RER) has increased, with significant effects on economic 
growth, capital movements and international trade (see Baig, 2001, and Hviding, Nowak and 
Ricci, 2004), especially in the developing countries, where financial liberalisation and the 
abolition of exchange controls have resulted in large fluctuations of real exchange rates (see, 
e.g., Reinhart and Smith 2001, and Corden 2002). Other authors, however, believe that 
financial openness can have a stabilising effect on exchange rate fluctuations (see, for 
example, Aguirre and Calderon, 2005; 2006), as well as lead to higher growth (see Prasad et 
al, 2003). Further, countries may be in a better position if they meet the challenges of 
financial integration, by attracting foreign investors, and hence stimulating domestic 
investment (see Goldstein and Turner, 2004). International financial integration can also 
increase liquidity and result in more effective risk diversification (see Le Fort, 2000).  
 
The aim of this paper is to provide some new empirical evidence on the determinants of 
volatility of real exchange rates in emerging countries, focusing on the role of international 
financial integration in particular.  A reduced-form model is estimated using the GMM 
method for dynamic panels over the period 1979-2004 for a sample of 39 developing 
countries grouped into three regions (Latin America, Asia and MENA). Our findings suggest 
that different types of shocks (external, real and monetary) can account for volatility of real 
exchange rates in emerging economies, with international financial integration being a major 
driving force. Therefore, financial liberalisation and integration should be pursued only 
gradually in emerging countries. 
 
The layout of the paper is the following. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on financial 
integration and real exchange rate fluctuations. Section 3 discusses the data and outlines the 
econometric methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical findings. Section 5 offers some 
concluding remarks.   
 
2. Financial Integration on Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations  
 
2.1 Theory 
The theoretical literature on the effects of capital controls is rather limited. Moreover, only a 
few papers argue that financial openness reduces real exchange rate fluctuations (see Aguirre 
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and Calderon, 2005). Prasad et al. (2003) also conclude that financial integration and 
liberalisation of capital flows reduce volatility as well as increase growth. Goldstein and 
Turner (2004) point out that financial integration is likely to attract foreign investment and 
stimulate domestic investment. International financial integration and liberalisation of the 
capital account can also increase the effectiveness of consumption smoothing and risk 
diversification, as well as the liquidity of financial markets (see Le Fort, 2000). Thus, as 
argued by Fischer (2003), emerging countries have liberalised capital flows because of the 
expected gains from financial globalisation. However, Eatwell and Taylor (2002) emphasise 
that the net benefits of liberalisation are difficult to identify, because of the costs of higher 
volatility. Obstfeld (1984) considers the two extreme cases of a closed capital account and of 
free mobility of capital. He argues that the removal of capital controls leads to an initial 
period of real appreciation: in the short term, an increase of the stock of net foreign assets, by 
boosting the demand for non-tradeable goods, generates excess demand for labour in the 
household goods sector and thus an appreciation of the real exchange rate, external deficits 
and capital inflows.  
  
However, according to other authors, such as Le Fort (2000), the expected impact of financial 
integration on RER fluctuations is low, even zero, if the exchange rate system is more 
flexible. Indeed, the higher volatility of floating exchange rates can be offset by a high degree 
of capital mobility, which can help to absorb external shocks, even though it is not a 
guarantee against long-lived misalignments. Frankel et al. (1996) analyse the effects of taxes 
on capital flows by using a simple monetary model in which capital controls reduce the 
influence of short-term speculators on the exchange rate. Buch, Döpke and Purdziach (2002) 
show that introducing the Tobin tax in the Dornbusch (1976) model reduces exchange rates 
volatility.  
 
The IMF (1998) takes the view that restrictions on capital movements are sometimes 
necessary to reduce RER volatility1. DeGregorio, Eichengreen, Ito and Wyplosz (2000) 
advocate short-term capital controls to reduce vulnerability to financial crises and contagion. 
However, Frankel and al. (2001) show that capital controls, in addition to reducing exchange 
rate volatility, increase the risk premium on domestic assets, thus increasing the domestic 
interest rate and reducing investment and growth. Reinhart and Smith (2001) and Corden 
                                                 
1 See also Prasad et al. (2003), and Eichengreen (1998). 
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(2002) conclude that, owing to massive capital flows caused in the short run by the opening of 
the capital account, a RER appreciation is inevitable, regardless of the choice of exchange rate 
regime. According to Prasard et al. (2003), the transition to capital mobility should be 
gradual, because a premature opening could result in significant costs (see Andersen and 
Moreno, 2005). Jongwanich (2006) stresses that monitoring capital flows and their volatility 
in the short term is useful to avoid a RER appreciation. Egert, Révil and Lommatzsch (2004) 
show that an improvement in the net external position leads to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. Finally, Edwards and Rigobon (2005) argue that capital controls reduce the 
vulnerability of the nominal exchange rate to external shocks and lead to a depreciation of the 
real exchange rate.  
 
2.2 Empirical Evidence 
Only a few empirical studies have analysed the effects of financial integration on the 
dynamics of the short-term RER. Hooper and Morton (1982) found a positive correlation 
between net foreign assets and the RER. Obstfeld (1984) showed that the liberalisation of 
capital movements led to a RER appreciation in Latin America. Basurto and Ghosh (2000), 
using the method of Vahid and Engle (1993), confirmed the existence of a common cycle 
between the nominal exchange rate and the interest rate differential in the case of the Japanese 
Yen and Deutsch Mark exchange rates vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, whilst the relationship was 
less clear for the Canadian dollar. They explained these results by pointing out that an 
increase in domestic interest rates leads to capital inflows, and thus an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. 
 
Chang and Velasco (2001) focused on the South-East Asia crisis of 1997-98, and the 
Argentine one of 2002, when panic seized foreign investors and led to bank failures and 
currency depreciation. Hau (2002) reported instead that, in a sample of 23 OECD countries 
over the 1980-1998 period, the RER was less volatile in the more open countries with more 
liberalised financial markets. Calderon (2003) assessed the determinants of real exchange rate 
volatility for 21 industrialised countries. Using quarterly data, he concluded that trade 
liberalisation is likely to mitigate RER volatility. Calderon (2004) studied the effect of 
financial openness and trade on RER volatility in a panel of industrialised and emerging 
economies over the period 1974-2003. Using the dynamic GMM method, he found that 
liberalisation reduced RER volatility. Edwards and Rigobon (2005) estimated a structural 
VAR for Chile and concluded that removing capital controls makes the nominal exchange rate 
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more vulnerable to external shocks and results in a RER depreciation. Finally, Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2005) analysed the interaction between financial globalisation and RER, by 
examining assets and liabilities for a panel of emerging countries. Their results indicate that 
the decrease in the net external position from 1990 to 1996 led to a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. 
 
Given the small number of contributions considering international financial integration as a 
possible driving source of RER fluctuations, we estimate below a model which enables us to 
evaluate the relative contribution of various shocks to the RER, including international 
financial integration, in a panel of emerging countries. 
 
3. Econometric Framework 
 
3.1 Data and Model Specification 
We consider four possible types of shocks to the RER: 
  
i) domestic real shocks affecting supply, such as productivity shocks;  
ii) domestic real shocks affecting demand, such as changes in consumption and investment 
behaviour;  
iii) external real shocks such as changes in the terms of trade;  
iv) nominal shocks reflecting changes in money demand relative to supply and changes in the 
nominal exchange rate 
 
 
Compared with the study of Hau (2002), we examine a large sample of emerging countries 
(39 of them) instead of 23 OECD countries, and over a longer time period (1979-2004, 
instead of 1980-1998). Also, we use panel data rather than time series methods. In comparison 
to Caldéron (2004), we introduce into the model additional fundamentals, such as technical 
progress, possibly driving RER. Moreover, we use the recent data on financial integration 
provided by Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2006), and the classification of exchange rate regimes of 
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005).  
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Our sample includes data on the real exchange rate, output, terms of trade, government 
expenditure, money supply, exchange rate regimes, as well as the commercial and financial 
openness for a sample of 39 countries, divided into three regions: 20 Latin American 
countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Trinidad, Uruguay, Venezuela), 10 South East Asian countries (Bangladesh, China, 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand) and 9 countries 
from the MENA region (Algeria, Egypt , Iran, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey). The variables are calculated as follows: 
  
* The dependent variable, RER volatility, is calculated as the standard deviation of changes in 
the real effective exchange rate over a period of 5 years. The RER is defined as *EP
P  where P 
and P* are the domestic and foreign CPI (the US being the foreign country), and E is the 
nominal exchange rate taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) (2006). 
Our definition of RER implies that an increase (decrease) in RER indicates an appreciation 
(depreciation). 
   
* The explanatory variables in the model are: 
(i) The volatility of fundamentals, data for which are obtained from the WDI (World 
Development Indicators, 2006), namely:  
 
   - Output volatility, measured by the standard deviation of the growth rate of real GDP. 
These data have also been used by Loayza, Fajnzylber and Calderón (2004);  
  - Volatility of public spending (PS), calculated as the standard deviation of changes in public 
consumption;  
  - Volatility of money supply, i.e. the standard deviation of the growth rate of the monetary 
base.  
  - Volatility of terms of trade (TT6,) measured by the standard deviation of changes in the 
terms of trade. 
 
(ii) Economic openness defined as: 
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     - Trade openness, averaged over 5 years, this variable being approximated by the share of 
imports and exports in total household expenditure; 
  
     - International financial integration, again averaged over 5 years (from the database of 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2006). Three indicators are considered: the sum of stocks of FDI 
and portfolio investments, relative to GDP (IFI1), total liabilities and assets relative to GDP 
(IFI2), and the Net Foreign Assets (NFA) position, i.e. the difference between total assets and 
liabilities (in absolute value), which is another indicator of international financial integration. 
We also include a capital control variable that takes the value of 1 if there is capital 
liberalisation, and 0 in the case of capital restrictions. The data are from the IMF’s "Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions” (2006). 
 
iii) The foreign exchange regime, averaged over 5 years, following the classification of 
exchange regimes of Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). Finally, real GDP is taken from the 
WDI (2006). 
 
Most earlier empirical studies of RER volatility are of a static nature. Only a few recent 
papers (Calderon, 2004; Bussiere et al., 2004, Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogoff, 2006, 
Nardis et al., 2008) adopt a dynamic approach, as we also do here. Specifically, we estimate 
equation (1) below, which regresses RER volatility against the volatility of fundamentals, 
financial integration, trade liberalisation and exchange rate regimes:  
 
                                         Yit = μi + φYit-1 + βXit + γFit + δZit + εit                           (1) 
 
where Yit stands for RER volatility, μi for unobserved country-specific effects, Xit is a vector 
including the volatility of fundamentals (the standard deviation of government spending 
shocks, real GDP, money supply and terms of trade); Fit is a measure of international financial 
integration (IFI1, IFI2 or NFA), Zit is a matrix of control variables, such as trade openness and 
the dummy variables taking into account changes in exchange rate regimes. 
 
3.2 Estimation Method 
 In a dynamic model which includes lags of the dependent variable as explanatory variables 
standard econometric techniques (OLS, IV, etc.) do not yield efficient estimates of the 
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parameters (Sevestre, 2002). The GMM method provides a solution to the problems of 
simultaneity bias, reverse causality and omitted variable bias (Kpodar, 2007), as well as 
yielding estimates of unobserved country-specific effects and dummy coefficients for which 
the usual methods ("within" or "difference") would be inappropriate given the dynamic nature 
of the regression (see Calderon et al. 2006). 
There are two types of GMM estimators: the first-difference and the system one. In the 
former case, all variables are first-differenced to eliminate individual and time-specific 
effects. Variables in levels lagged twice or more are then used as instruments for the 
explanatory variables, assuming that the errors of the equation in levels are not autocorrelated. 
However, those lagged variables are weak instruments. That is why Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) have proposed a system GMM estimator, which is 
based on assumptions about the initial conditions such that the moment conditions remain 
valid even for persistent series. This estimator combines the equations in first differences with 
equations in which the level variables are instrumented by their first differences. Blundell and 
Bond (1998) have shown using Monte Carlo simulations that the system GMM estimator is 
indeed more efficient than the first-difference one, the latter yielding biased estimates in finite 
samples if the instruments are weak2.  
 
Two types of tests are usually carried out in this context: the Sargan or Hansen test for over-
identifying restrictions to test the validity of the lagged variables as instruments (i.e., whether 
or not the instruments are exogenous), and the autocorrelation test of Arellano and Bond 
(1995) where the null hypothesis is no autocorrelation of second order of the errors of the 
equation in first differences. Appendix 1 provides more details of the GMM method. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
  
 
4.1 Descriptive and Correlation Analysis 
 We analyse first five-year averages over the period 1979-2004 for each country. Plots of 
RER volatility (see Figure 1 in Appendix 2) show a noticeable decrease in most countries in 
the last decade (especially in Asia and some countries in Latin America and MENA), which 
might reflect monetary policies aimed at reducing currency fluctuations. As for the degree of 
                                                 
2 See also Kpodar (2007), p.53. 
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international financial integration, this appears to increase sharply in the last decade (see 
Figure 2 in Appendix 2). 
 
Panel correlations between the volatility of the real exchange rate and its fundamentals 
(including international financial integration) are reported in Table 1: 
 
 
Table 1. RER Volatility and Financial Integration in Emerging Countries  
 
                    Total Panel                        Floating                   Intermediate                Fixed  
                     
               P. Corr.   P-value           P. Corr.   P-value         P. Corr.   P-value    P. Corr.   P-value 
 
 
vtt           0.450      (0.00)                0.385     (0.00)            0.442      (0.00)       0.578       (0.00)     
vrgdp       0.128      (0.07)                0.243      (0.04)            0.448     (0.00)      0.087       (0.49) 
vps          0.247      (0.00)              -0.185      (0.12)            0.206      (0.09)       0.487       (0.00)     
vmon       0.307      (0.00)               0.087      (0.27)            0.617      (0.00)       0.373       (0.00)         
Open      -0.108      (0.11)              -0.178      (0.14)          -0.380      (0.00)      -0.086       (0.50)           
IFI          0.280       (0.00)                0.093     (0.44)           -0.346      (0.00)       0.282       (0.02) 
NFA       0.646       (0.00)               0.030      (0.80)           -0.179      (0.11)       0.711       (0.00)   
CA        -0.044       (0.54)                0.211     (0.08)            0.094       (0.45)     -0.129       (0.31) 
        
 
Notes:  
a) the period is 1979-2004 (five-year averages). 
b) The panel correlation analysis was first performed for the 39 countries (total panel), then by exchange rate 
regime. To do this, for each country, a dummy variable ER was introduced taking respectively the values 0, 1, 2, 
if the exchange rate regime is either fixed, intermediate or flexible (following the classification of Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2005). 
c) The correlation is calculated between RER volatility and volatility of each other variable in turn. The variables 
vtt, vrgdp, vps, vmon, are respectively the volatility of the terms of trade, the growth rate of real GDP, 
government consumption and monetary base. Open stands for trade openness. The measures of financial 
integration are IFI2, Net Foreign Assets (NFA) and the opening of the current account (CA). 
 
It appears that RER volatility is positively correlated with the volatility of fundamentals, such 
as terms of trade, real GDP growth, government consumption and money supply. This 
suggests that it can be attributed to various types of shocks, in particular external shocks to the 
terms of trade and domestic real GDP; also monetary shocks are strongly and significantly 
correlated with the volatility of the real exchange rate, regardless of the exchange rate regime. 
Moreover, trade openness is negatively correlated with RER volatility, whilst international 
financial integration is positively correlated. However, the latter correlation is negative in the 
case of intermediate exchange rate regimes.  
 
Table 2 presents correlations for countries grouped by region. 
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Table 2. RER Volatility and Financial Integration in Emerging Countries by Region 
 
 
                        Total of Panel                       Floating                Intermediate                  Fixed 
                     
                P. Corr.     P-value        P. Corr.    P-value     P. Corr.    P-value     P. Corr.     P-value 
 
 
Latin America 
vtt          0.577       (0.00)               0.288      (0.09)           0.513      (0.00)         0.647        (0.00)     
vrgdp       0.102      (0.31)               0.379       (0.02)           0.410     (0.01)          0.371       (0.04) 
vps         0.228       (0.02)             -0.196       (0.26)           0.126     (0.46)          0.510       (0.00)     
vmon      0.323      (0.00)               0.157       (0.37)           0.606     (0.00)          0.360       (0.05)         
Open     -0.174      (0.26)              -0.315       (0.06)         -0.406     (0.01)         -0.104       (0.58)           
IFI          0.288      (0.00)               0.088       (0.61)          -0.441     (0.00)          0.272       (0.14) 
NFA       0.698      (0.00)               0.129       (0.46)           0.126     (0.46)          0.740       (0.00) 
CA        -0.129      (0.19)              -0.004       (0.97)          -0.147     (0.38)         -0.208      (0.26) 
 
Asia 
vtt           0.010     (0.94)               0.106       (0.68)          0.212       (0.39)          0.491       (0.05)     
vrgdp       0.616      (0.00)               0.491       (0.05)           0.704     (0.00)          0.332       (0.16) 
vps         -0.001     (0.96)              -0.360       (0.15)          0.243      (0.33)          0.097       (0.71)     
vmon       0.095     (0.26)               0.097       (0.71)          0.146       (0.56)         0.106       (0.68)         
Open      -0.010     (0.94)              -0.071       (0.78)         -0.053      (0.83)        -0.271       (0.24)           
IFI           0.193     (0.15)                0.364       (0.15)          0.369      (0.13)        -0.455       (0.08) 
NFA        0.231     (0.10)                0.322       (0.16)          0.580      (0.01)        -0.425       (0.10) 
CA          0.341      (0.01)                0.503       (0.03)          0.375      (0.12)          0.108      (0.70) 
 
MENA 
vtt           0.552      (0.00)                0.181      (0.48)           0.597     (0.05)         0.659       (0.00)     
vrgdp       0.205      (0.17)                0.003       (0.98)         -0.162     (0.63)         0.267       (0.29) 
vps          0.480      (0.00)                0.196       (0.44)          0.250     (0.45)         0.574       (0.01)     
vmon       0.415      (0.00)                0.160      (0.53)          0.903      (0.00)         0.748       (0.00)         
Open      -0.479      (0.00)               -0.337      (0.18)         -0.548     (0.08)        -0.568       (0.01)           
IFI          -0.390      (0.00)               -0.275      (0.28)         -0.614     (0.04)        -0.453       (0.06) 
NFA       -0.259      (0.08)               -0.256      (0.31)         -0.442     (0.17)        -0.224       (0.38) 
CA         -0.064      (0.67)                 0.390      (0.12)         -0.411     (0.20)        -0.312       (0.22) 
  
 
Notes:  
a) the period is 1979-2004 (five-year averages).  
b) The panel correlation analysis was first done by region (Latin America, Asia and MENA), then by exchange 
rate regime within each region. To do this, for each country in a given region, a dummy variable ER was 
introduced taking respectively the values 0, 1, 2, if the exchange rate regime is either fixed, intermediate or 
flexible (following the classification of Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005).  
c) The correlation is calculated between the RER volatility and the volatility of each other variable in turn. 
The variables vtt, vrgdp, vps, vmon, are respectively the volatility of the terms of trade, the growth rate of real 
GDP, government consumption and monetary base. Open stands for trade openness. The measures of financial 
integration are IFI2, Net Foreign Assets (NFA) and the opening of the current account (CA). 
 
 
It can be seen that RER volatility in Latin America is significantly and positively correlated 
with the external shocks to the terms of trade and the money supply. In Asia, instead, it is 
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significantly correlated with domestic shocks to real GDP. Note also the lack of correlation 
with trade openness for Latin America and Asia. Furthermore, financial integration is 
negatively correlated with RER volatility under the fixed exchange regime often adopted by 
Asian countries. Such a regime, as stressed by Ferrari (2000), and Obstfeld, Shambaugh and 
Taylor (2004), is not compatible with the new financial architecture, mainly characterised by 
international financial integration, although it might reduce RER volatility (see Figure 1 of 
Appendix 2). Regarding the MENA countries, we find in all cases a significant negative 
correlation between financial integration and RER volatility. The other shocks, including 
external and monetary shocks, also appear to be significantly positively correlated with RER 
volatility in the MENA. 
 
 
4.2 GMM Estimation   
The panel estimates for equation (1) using the GMM system estimator of Arellano and Bover 
(1995) are reported in Table 3. 
 
 
 
Table 3. RER Volatility and Financial Integration in Emerging Countries 
  
 
                                                                     [I]                                                          [II]                              
 
Volatility of RER t-1                                     1.73***                              1.05*** 
                                                                    (0.00)                            (0.00) 
Volatility of Terms of Trade                       1.54***                                                    0.85*** 
                                                                   (0.00)                             (0.00) 
Volatility of real GDP                                  0.75*                                                        1.32* 
                                                                   (0.10)                                                       (0.09) 
Volatility of Public Expenditure                 0.49                                  0.39 
                                                                   (0.14)                                 (0.17) 
Volatility of Money Supply                        0.94*                             
                                                                   (0.08)                                    
Trade Opening                                          -0.16***                            -0.15*** 
                                                                   (0.01)                            (0.00) 
IFI2                                                            0.06***                                     
                                                                   (0.00)                                                                  
 12
 CA                                                                                                                                0.09*** 
                                                                                                                                     (0.00) 
Number of countries                                       39                                39                              
Number of obs.                                            185                                                             185 
R2                                                                0.42                                                            0.51 
Specification Tests (p- values)          
    - Sargan Test                                          0.19                                                             0.29 
    - 2nd Order Autocorrelation                   0.12                                                             0.42 
 
Notes:  
a) The panel includes 39 countries and five-year averages over the period 1979-2004.  
b) Numbers in parentheses are p-values.  
c) *, ** and *** correspond to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively.  
Two sets of estimates were produced using IFI2 (or NFA) (see [I]), or the policy measure for international 
financial integration (see [II]). 
 
 
The specification tests of Sargan / Hansen and Arellano and Bover (1995) respectively 
suggest that the model is correctly specified (see bottom of Table 3). External shocks and 
volatility of real GDP appear to be the main driving forces of RER volatility. A positive shock 
of 1% to the terms of trade increases RER volatility by 1.54% or 0.85% based on estimation 
(I) and (II) respectively (see table 3). Real shocks are also an important source of volatility: a 
real supply shock in the form of a 1% increase in the growth rate of real GDP increases RER 
volatility by 0.75% or 1.32% based on model (I) and (II) respectively. In addition, an increase 
in government consumption by 1% increases the volatility of the real exchange rate by 0.49% 
or 0.39% respectively. The monetary shock also plays a role, being statistically significant at 
the 10% (model II), consistently with the correlation analysis. Trade openness has a 
statistically significant effect at the 1% level, with an increase by 1% reducing RER volatility 
by 16% or 15% based on model (I) or (II) respectively. As for international financial 
integration, a positive 1% shock to FDI stocks and portfolio investment increases RER 
volatility by 0.06%, whilst an increase of 1% in capital controls increases RER volatility by 
0.09. This finding is consistent with those of some earlier studies (see Reinhart and Smith, 
2001; Corden, 2002), and presumably reflects the fact that many emerging countries are 
moving towards more flexible exchange rate regimes and a higher degree of international 
financial integration. Finally, it should be noted that, in contrast to what suggested by the 
correlation analysis, the exchange rate regime has no significant effect (and is therefore not 
included in Table 3). This might be due to the heterogeneity of the panel in this respect.  
 13
 
To study the sensitivity of the previous results to geographical zones, Table 4 presents 
estimates of equation (1) by region, using again the GMM system-method. 
 
Table 4. RER Volatility and Financial Integration in emerging countries classified by regions 
                                                                   
          MENA                   Asia               Latin America                                   
 
Constant                             -0.98*** 
                                                                                              (0.00)             
Volatility of RERt-1                                              1.09***                   0.75***                     1.76*** 
                                                                 (0.00)                    (0.01)                     (0.00) 
Volatility of Terms of Trade                              0.17            2.52***                  
                                                                                               (0.19)                     (0.00)    
Volatility of Real GDP                                                             1.24***   
                                                                                               (0.00)    
Volatility of Public Expenditure             1.37***                    0.27*             0 .60 
                                                                 (0.00)                    (0.13)            (0. 17)                          
Volatility of Money Supply                      0.32                0.785*                              
                                                                 (0.15)                        (0.10)                              
Trade Opening                                          -0.08**                    -0.05                      -0.22                           
                                                                (0.03)                    (0.16)                       (0.16)                            
Financial Integration3                               -0.05**                     0.10**              0.09***                              
                                                                (0.03)                     (0.02)                        (0.00)                            
Exchange Rate Regime 2.41**                     1.44 
                                                                (0.02)                     (0.15)    
 
Number of countries                                  9                             10                          20                                  
Number of countries                                40                            45                               90                                  
R2                                                          0.60                         0.39                           0.86                              
Specification Tests (p-values)          
    - Sargan Test                                     0.46                         0.74                           0.33                              
    - 2nd Order Autocorrelation               0.83                         0.10                           0.46                       
 
                                                 
3 To measure international financial integration we use ANE for Asia, and IFI2 for the MENA region and for 
Latin America.  
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Notes:  
a) The panels include in turn twenty Latin American countries, ten Asian and nine MENA countries. The period 
is 1979-2004 (five-year averages).  
b) Numbers in parentheses are p-values.  
c) *, ** and *** correspond to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. 
  
 
 
Table 4 suggests that external and monetary shocks are the main sources of real exchange rate 
volatility in Latin America. The importance of the nominal shock is consistent with the 
"imbalance" approach to exchange rate fluctuations (see Mundell, 1962, Fleming, 1962) and 
Dornbusch, 1976). Openness increases stability of the real exchange rate, as expected. As for 
international financial integration, it is clearly an important source of volatility of the real 
exchange rate in Latin America. 
 
In Asia, RER volatility is mainly due to domestic real shocks, which confirms the results of 
the correlation analysis and is consistent with "New Open Macroeconomic" models. The 
small role of external shocks may reflect the success of exchange rate policies implemented in 
several Asian countries (e.g. China, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand) to achieve exchange rate 
stability. Monetary shocks appear to have no effect here, whilst greater openness reduces RER 
volatility. As for international financial integration, it makes the RER more volatile, 
notwithstanding the adoption of a fixed exchange rate regime aimed at reducing fluctuations. 
It would appear that such exchange rate policies are not entirely compatible with the new 
international financial architecture. Finally, the choice of exchange rate regime seems to have 
a limited impact on RER volatility. 
 
In the MENA region, monetary shocks and real demand shocks are the main determinants of 
RER volatility. This region is also subject to external shocks, but not to the terms of trade. 
Trade openness appears to have a stabilising effect on the real exchange rate, suggesting 
consistency between trade and exchange rate policies. Moreover, in contrast to other regions, 
international financial integration reduces RER volatility, consistently with the correlation 
analysis and other studies (e.g., Aguirre and Calderon, 2006), suggesting that the exchange 
rate policies adopted in this region are appropriate in the new international context. Finally, 
the exchange rate regime has a significant effect at the 1% level. This might reflect the 
monetary policies adopted by the majority of these countries (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Turkey), whose main objective is price stability. 
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5. Conclusions 
 In this paper we have examined the determinants of RER volatility in a panel of 39 emerging 
countries over the period 1979-2004, paying particular attention to the role of international 
financial integration. The inclusion of this variable and the adoption of an appropriate 
econometric method, namely the GMM system-estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) for 
dynamic panels enable us to obtain more reliable results and shed new light on this issue. Our 
findings suggest that emerging countries as a whole are subject to various types of shocks 
(external, real and monetary) that may explain the variability of the real exchange rate. The 
analysis by geographical region indicates that monetary and external shocks play a major role 
in both Latin America and the MENA region, whilst domestic real shocks are the main 
driving force in South East Asia. Trade openness helps to stabilise the RER in most countries, 
whereas the choice of exchange rate regime has a significant effect only in the MENA region. 
 
Furthermore, our estimates show that international financial integration is an important source 
of real exchange rate variability in emerging countries, consistently with some earlier studies 
(Reinhart and Smith, 2001; Corden, 2002). In the Asian and Latin American countries it 
amplifies fluctuations of the real exchange rate, even in the presence of a fixed exchange rate 
regime aimed at reducing them, suggesting that such exchange rate policies are incompatible 
with the new international financial architecture. By contrast, in the MENA region, 
international financial integration is conducive to stability of the real exchange rate. A 
possible explanation is given by the adoption in these countries of a more flexible exchange 
regime, consistent with international financial integration and the new global economic 
environment. A gradual approach to liberalisation might, however, be necessary to reduce the 
difficulties possibly arising from a sudden switch to openness and flexibility. 
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Appendix 1  
 
The GMM Method 
 
We use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator for dynamic panels 
introduced by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), and 
Arellano and Bover (1995). It is based on, first, differencing the series to control for 
unobserved effects, and, second, using lagged explanatory and dependent variables as 
instruments, called “internal” instruments. 
  
After accounting for time-specific effects, the set of explanatory variables X, we rewrite  
equation (1) (see section 3.1) as follows: 
 
Yit =α Yi, t-1 + β’X it +η i +εit                             (2) 
                                                   
In order to eliminate the country- specific effect, we take first-differences of equation (2), 
 
(Yit - Yi,t-1) = α (Yi, t-1 – Yi, t-2) + β (Xit-Xi, t-1) + (εit – εi, t-1)          (3) 
 
The use of instruments is required to deal with the likely endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables and the fact that, by construction, the new error term, (eit - eit-1), is correlated with 
the lagged dependent variable, ( y i,t-1 − y i,t−2). 
             
Taking advantage of the panel nature of the data set, the instruments consist of previous 
observations of the explanatory and lagged dependent variables. As it relies on past values as 
instruments, this method only allows current and future values of the explanatory variables to 
be affected by the error term. Therefore, while relaxing the common assumption of strict 
exogeneity, it does not allow the X variables to be fully endogenous. 
 
 Under the assumptions that (a) the error term, ε, is not serially correlated, and (b) the 
explanatory variables, X, are weakly exogenous (i. e., they are uncorrelated with future 
realisations of the error term), the GMM Dynamic panel estimator uses the following moment 
conditions: 
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[ ] 0)(. 1,,, =− −− titistiYE εε      for 2≥s  ; tst ......=                                     (4) 
[ ] 0)(. 1,,, =− −− titistiXE εε   for 2≥s  ; tst ......=                                       (5) 
                                                      
The GMM estimator based on these conditions is known as the difference estimator. 
Notwithstanding its advantages with respect to simpler panel data estimators, it has statistical 
shortcomings. Alonso- Borrego and Arellano (1999) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that 
when the explanatory variables are persistent over time, lagged levels of these variables are 
weak instruments for the regression equation in differences. Instrument weakness influences 
the asymptotic and small sample performance of the difference estimator. Asymptotically, the 
variance of the coefficients rises in small samples. In addition, the Monte Carlo experiments 
show that the weakness of the instruments can produce biased coefficients.  
 
To reduce the potential biases and imprecision associated with the usual difference estimator, 
we use a new estimator that combines in a system the regression in differences with the 
regression in levels (see Arellano and Bover ,1995, and Blundell and Bond, 1998). The 
instruments for the regression in differences are the same as above. Those for the regression 
in levels are the lagged differences of the corresponding variables. These are appropriate 
instruments under the following additional assumptions: although there may be correlation 
between the levels of the right- hand side variables and the country- specific effect in equation 
(3), there is no correlation between the differences of these variables and the country-specific 
effects. This assumption results from the following stationarity property, 
 
           [ ] [ ]iqtiipti YEYE ηη .. ,, ++ =                                                    (6) 
                           [ ] [ ]iqtiipti XEXE ηη .. ,, ++ =                        
 
The additional moment conditions for the regression in levels are4:  
[ ] 0)).(( ,2,1, =+− −− tiititi YYE εη                                                                       (7) 
[ ] 0)).(( ,2,1, =+− −− tiititi XXE εη                                                                    (8) 
  
                                                 
4 Given that lagged levels are used as instruments in the differences specification, only the most recent 
difference is used as instrument in the levels specification. Using other lagged differences would result in 
redundant moment conditions (see Arellano and Bover, 1995). 
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 We use the moment conditions given by equations (4), (5), (7), and (8) and employ a GMM 
procedure to generate consistent and efficient parameter estimates.  
 
We employ a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure to generate consistent 
estimates of the parameters of interest and their asymptotic variance-covariance (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995). These are given by the following formulae: 
 
YZZXXZZX '')''( 111 −−− ΩΩ= σ                                                                            (9) 
AVAR 11 )'ˆ'()( −−Ω= XZZXσ                                                                                      (10) 
 
where θ is the vector of parameters of interest (α, β), y is the dependent variable stacked first 
in differences and then in levels, X is the explanatory variable matrix including the lagged 
dependent variable (yt-1, X) stacked first in differences and then in levels, Z is the matrix of 
instruments derived from the moment conditions, and Ωˆ is a consistent estimate of the 
variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions.  
 
The consistency of the GMM Estimator depends on whether lagged values of the explanatory 
variables are valid instruments in the regression. We address this issue by considering two 
specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). 
The first is the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. It tests the overall validity of the 
instruments by analysing the sample analogue of the moment conditions used in the 
estimation process. Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model. 
 
The second test examines the null hypothesis that the error term εi,t is not serially correlated. 
As in the case of the Sargan test, the model specification is supported when the null 
hypothesis is not rejected. In the system specification, we test whether the differenced error 
term (that is, the residual of the regression in differences) exhibits second-order serial 
correlation. First-order serial correlation of the differenced error term is expected even if the 
original error term (in levels) is uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a random walk. 
Second-order serial correlation of the differenced residual indicates that the original error 
term is serially correlated and follows a moving average process at least of order one. This 
would imply that the proposed instruments are not valid (and that higher-order lags should be 
used as instruments). 
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Appendix 2 
 
Evolution of RER Volatility and International Financial Integration in Emerging Countries 
(1979-2004) 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of RER Volatility in emerging countries, classified by region (1979-2004) 
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Figure 2. Evolution of International Financial Integration in Emerging Countries, classified by 
region (1979-2004) 
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1.8
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
 Malaysia
1.60
1.65
1.70
1.75
1.80
1.85
1.90
1.95
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Pakistan
1.84
1.88
1.92
1.96
2.00
2.04
2.08
2.12
2.16
2.20
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Philippines
1.76
1.80
1.84
1.88
1.92
1.96
2.00
2.04
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Sri Lanka
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
 Thailand
Evolution of International Financial Integration in Asia (1979-2004)
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1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.1
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Algeria
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Egypt
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Iran
2.00
2.05
2.10
2.15
2.20
2.25
2.30
2.35
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Israel
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Jordan
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Morocco
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Syria
1.88
1.92
1.96
2.00
2.04
2.08
2.12
2.16
2.20
2.24
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Tunisia
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.1
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Turkey
Evolution of International Financial Integration in MENA region (1979-2004)
 
Sources: our calculations using data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2006), and 
World Development Indicators (WDI, 2006) 
 
 
 
